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This article proposes an analysis, which we consider extremely useful in the current economic 
context, of the evolution of labour income fiscality, more precisely, the effect of the public debt 
growth on the tax wedge for the labour income.  
The share of fiscal revenues from direct taxes, indirect taxes and social contributions is relatively 
close in the old member states of the European Union in comparison with the new member states, 
which register a lower level of income from direct taxes. The low level of income from direct 
taxes is compensated by more significant shares of the social contributions or indirect taxes. 
The  main  motivations  of  cross-border  migration  are:  a  successful  career  in  a  multinational 
corporation, high variations of the tax rate, of the salary income between states and, last but not 
least,  the  level  of  the  net  salary.  To  this  day,  there  are  no  plans  to  harmonize  across  the 
European Union the legislation regarding the taxes wages and  the social security contributions. 
Still, the European Union had in view the coordination of the national tax systems to make sure 
that the employees and the employers do not pay several times the social contributions in their 
movement across the community space. 
Despite the fact that some states tax the labour income at a low level, the labour fiscality remains 
high in the European Union in comparison with other industrialized economies, probably also 
due to the fact that the majority of the member states have social market economies. The increase 
of the fiscality level for the labour income determines the decrease of the employment rate and 
the raise of the unemployement rate. 
The solution to guarantee a higher employment rate, which is a target of the European Union 
Strategy „Europe 2020” could be the relaxation of the labour income fiscality by transferring the 
tax wedge on the labour income towards property or energy taxation. 
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1. Introduction 
The mechanism of the Single European Market is based on the four freedoms acknowledged by 
the European Community legislation: the free movement of goods, people, services and capital. 
The  main  motivations  of  cross-border  migration  are:  a  successful  career  in  a  multinational 
corporation, high variations of the tax rate, of the salary income between states and, last but not 
least,  the  level  of  the  net  salary.  According  to  some  research  realized  in  Switzerland 
(Kirchgassner, Pommerehne, 2001) and (Feld, Kirchgassner, 2001) we can notice that the level of 
payroll tax and the level of social contributions have an important influence on the dispersion of 
the labour force with high income (Peter Egger and Doina Maria Radulescu 2008: 2). 
To this day there are no plans to harmonize across the European Union the legislation regarding 
the social security contributions. Still, the European Union had in view the coordination of the 
national tax systems to make sure that the employees and the employers do not pay several times 
the social contributions in their movement across the community space.  
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If we analyze the structure of budgetary income collected by the European Union, according to 
the economic classification, the labour taxation and the compulsory social contributions are the 
most important source of revenue, representing an average of 50% of the budgetary income 
collected in the European Union. Thus, the labour taxes collected by ten member states: Hungary, 
Slovenia,  Czech  Republic,  Holland,  France,  Belgium,  Finland,  Denmark,  Greece  and  Italy 
represent between 50-55% of the total income; the labour taxes collected by four states: Sweden, 
Austria, Germany and Estonia exceed 55% of the total income. 
Concerning the rates of labour taxation, the following figure proves that these are the highest of 
the European Union, amounting to 34%-36% in comparison with the lower rates of capital gain 
tax and consumption tax. 
 
 





During the period before the crisis, in the European Union, generally speaking, the tax wedge 
increased especially concerning the labour taxes and the social contributions as a result of the 
need to finance the government expenditures. 
During the period after the crisis, the fiscal measures to support the employment offer adopted in 
the majority of the European Union states visible in the reduction of the fiscality for labour 
income led to a decrease of the share of the direct fiscal incomes. The tax wedge on the salary 
income, especially for the low incomes decreased in almost all member states. Instead, the level 
of social contributions, which increased during the period 2008-2009 registered an asymmetrical 
evolution. (European Commission, Taxation Papers, 2010: 18). 
 
2. Aspects regarding the taxes wages in the European Union 
The labour tax rates in the EU increased continually from 28% in 1970 to approximately 42% in 
1997. The continual growth of labour fiscality was due to the tendency of excessive increase of 
the unemployment rate at the beginning of the 1990s, as a result of the recession. Thus, at the end 
of the 90s the concerns aiming to decrease the excessive employment costs in order to stimulate 
the employment rate became more important. While some measures could be generally applied 
like: the decrease of labour tax rates or of the social contributions rate, others aimed at certain 
target groups: the decrease of the contribution rates for the unskilled workers. 
Regarding the fiscal reforms adopted by the member states, the national governments preferred 
measures  in  order  to  narrow  the  taxable  base  or  to  grant  allowances  for  the  low  income 
households rather than to reduce the tax rate. Thus, measures meant to increase the labour tax rate  
440 
were adopted by Greece, France, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia, Great Britain, Ireland; measures 
meant to decrease the labour tax rates were adopted by Austria, Germany, Denmark, France, 
Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania. Measures meant to increase the taxable base were 
adopted by states such as Denmark, Greece, Estonia, Spain, Ireland, Hungary, Portugal; measures 
meant  to  decrease  the  taxable  base  were  adopted  by  Austria,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Germany, 
Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Holland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden. Fewer 
fiscal measures were adopted regarding the social contributions. The states which chose to apply 
measures  meant  to  increase  the  social  contributions  rates  were:  Cyprus,  Estonia,  Portugal, 
Slovakia,  Finland;  the  states  which  chose to  decrease  them  were:  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic, 
Sweden. The enlargement of the taxable base was adopted by the following states: Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the narrowing of the taxable base was adopted by 
Finland. 
The series of changes occurred during the period 2000-2008 had a very different effect upon the 
labour fiscality in the member states. The states of Central and Eastern Europe which joined the 
European Union in 2004 and 2007 faced a decline stronger than 4.4% of the labour tax rates, a 
decrease of 4.4%, while the average decrease of tax rates in the European Union was of 1.7%. 
The strongest diminution of these rates, of 11.1% was registered in Bulgaria and an increase of 
the rates was registered in Portugal (2.4%, Greece (2.5%), Spain (1,9%), Luxembourg (1.6%), 
Cyprus (2.9). During the period 2000-2008, in Romania, the labour tax rates decreased by 4%. 
(European Commission, Taxation trends in European Union, 2010: 107). 
The  international  economic  and  financial  crisis  did  not  determine  a  decrease  of  the  labour 
fiscality. If we analyze the situation in the member states, we can notice that the most significant 
decrease of the labour tax rates was registered in Denmark, Estonia, Romania, Ireland, Sweden, 
Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania. We can also notice that the taxation level in the three northern 
states is closet o the European Union average. The labour tax rates increased significantly in 
Cyprus, Portugal, Greece, below the European average in the case of the first two. The lowest 
labour tax rates are registered in Malta (20.2%), Cyprus (24.5%), Ireland (24.6%) and the highest 
labour tax rates are Italy (42.8%), Belgium (42.6%) and Hungary (42.4%). 
If we analyze the salary tax evolution, we can notice that the decline of the tax wedge on the 
labour income is due to the decrease of the social contribution rates, as well as of the tax rates of 
the natural persons’ income. The tax wedge is calculated by dividing the payroll tax, the social 
contributions paid by the employee and by the employer and other taxes to the total labour cost. 
The tax wedge supported by the employee and bt the employer for the labour force is quite high 
in the European Union and this represents one of the main causes for the poor performance 
concerning employment in the European Union. 
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Figure 2. The structure of the tax wedge – the level of labour taxation in 2008 
(Implicit tax rate on Labour)(%) 
 
Source: European Commission, Taxation trends in European Union, “ Data for the EU member states, 
Iceland and Norway”, 2010,  p. 110 
If we analyze the structure of labour taxation in the European Union, we can notice that its largest 
share is represented by the employer’s compulsory social contributions, closely followed by the 
payroll taxes and the employee’s social contributions. 
Thus, in Denmark, Ireland and Great Britain, the largest share of the tax wedge on the labour 
income is represented by the payroll taxes and in states like Romania, Slovakia, Greece, the 
largest share is represented by the social contributions, the payroll tax representing less than 20%. 
The labour tax and the social contributions attenuate the economic fluctuations by decreasing the 
available income volatility. In many member states, the progressive character of the payroll taxes 
is  often  compensated  by  the  regressive  system  of  compulsory  social  contributions.  The 
diminution of the tax wedge for the low wages increased the progressiveness of the tax wedge in 
the  member  states.  The  majority  of  the  member  states  collect  taxes  on  the  natural  persons 
progressive income. Seven member states apply progressive tax rates on the natural persons’ 
income: Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia. 
 
Table 1. The tax wedge on labour income – single worker with average income (% of the 
labour cost) in 2009 
 
Source: European Commission, Taxation Papers, Monitoring tax revenues and tax reforms in EU Member 
States 2010,” Tax policy after the crisis”, Working Paper nr. 24, 2010, pp. 84  
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A  research conducted  by  the  World  Bank  in  eight  member  states:  Czech  Republic,  Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia concerning the relationship between the tax 
wedge on labour income and the employment level revealed that there is an inverse relationship 
between the tax wedge and employment. Is was also revealed that the labour force structure – 
with many unskilled workers, compulsory minimum wages, high level of labour taxation and 
progressive fiscal systems have worse effects on employment than in the rest of the European 
Union member states. (World Bank,  EU-8 Quarterly Economic Report, 2005:12). 
In  the  case  of  low-wages  category,  it  is  important  to  analyze  the  stimulants  offered  by  the 
employees. In this respect, two indicators were developed: the effective marginal tax rate and the 
effective average tax rate, in order to study the effect of wage modifications. If the first rate takes 
into account the marginal modification of salary income, the second takes into account the salary 
changes implicit to the transition from unemployed to employed. The effective average tax rate is 
a  specific  concept  of  unemployment  or  inactivity;  it  is  used  to  monitor  the  labour  market 
distortions, especially regarding financial constraints in order to gain access to a job. 
It  is  also  obvious  that  an  increase  of  the  tax  wedge  has  a  stronger  negative  effect  on  the 
employment level in the case of workers with a lower qualification level. A research conducted in 
Belgium, Holland and France confirms this observation since a decrease of fiscality for the low-
income workers led to a considerable increase of the employment level. 
 
3. Aspects regarding the importance of compulsory social contributions to the formation of 
public income in the EU 
The share of fiscal revenues from direct taxes, indirect taxes and social contributions is relatively 
close in the old member states of the European Union in comparison with the new member states, 
which register a lower level of income from direct taxes. The low level of income from direct 
taxes is compensated by more significant shares of the social contributions or indirect taxes. 
While in some states such as Bulgaria, Romania, Malta and Cyprus the most significant share of 
the budgetary income is represented by the income from indirect taxes, in other states like Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Germany and France, the income from social contributions is high. At the 
opposite side are Denmark, Ireland and Great Britain, states which collect relatively low income 
from  social  contributions.  The  motivation  for  the  very  low  level  of  social  contributions  in 
Denmark is the fact that its social expenditures are not financed by the social insurance budgets, 
but by income from general taxes. This explains the very high level of direct taxes, one of the 
highest in the European Union. 
If we analyze the evolution of the budgetary income, we can notice that in time most of the states 
changed the structure of he budgetary income. For example, in case of Latvia and Slovenia, the 
increase of the share of the direct taxes was compensated by a decrease of the social contributions 
and of indirect taxes. In Sweden, the increase of the share of indirect taxes meant a decrease of 
the share of direct taxes and social contributions in the total income. In Greece, the decline of 
direct and indirect taxes was completed by an increase of the social contributions rates. 
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Figure 3. The share of social contributions in the total tax wedge (%) in 2008 
 
 
Source: European Commission, Taxation trends in European Union, “ Data for the EU member states, 
Iceland and Norway”, 2010,  p. 68 
 
In Austria, the most important share of the tax wedge is represented by the social contributions. 
The  social  contributions  rate  supported  by  the  employees  is  approximately  18%,  the  social 
contributions rate supported by the employer is 21.5%, and in case of income earned out of 
independent activities, the social contribution rate is 25%. 
In 2010, the total social contributions collected in Bulgaria reached almost 28.5% of the income, 
out of which the most important part was represented by the contributions to social insurances – 
pensions – which decreased in 2010 from 18% to 16%, decrease compensated by an increase of 
the direct tax rates. 
In Czech Republic, the most important source of budgetary income is represented by the social 
contributions  (44.9%  of  the  total  collected  income).  The  level  of  income  from  social 
contributions is the highest of the European Union, followed by Slovakia and Germany. Taking 
into account this aspect, the income from direct and indirect taxes is under the European Union 
average. The social contribution rate owed by the employees is 11%, out of which 6.5% for the 
social insurances – pensions and 6.5% for social health insurances. The social contributions rate 
owed by the employer is 34% of the gross income. In Finland, the social contributions level owed 
by the employer is 28%. 
The level of social contributions owed by the employer registered in France in 2008 was the 
second in the European Union after Czech Republic. The social contribution rate owed by the 
employer  is  high  in  France,  amounting  to  35%-45%  of  the  income  in  comparison  with  the 
contributions owed by the employees which amounts to 14% (European Commission, Taxation 
trends in European Union, 2010:  p. 160-272). 
In  Sweden,  the  social  contributions  have  the  lowest  share in  the total  budgetary  income.  In 
Sweden, most of the social contributions is paid by the employers (31.42%). The employees pay 
an additional rate of 7% for the social insurances. In order to facilitate youth employment, the 
employers benefit from a reduced rate of social insurance for people under 26. 
In Ireland, the share of social contributions to the total income is not significant – only 18.2% 
because of the very low level of labour taxation in comparison to the European Union average. 
The increase of labour tax rate starting with 2000 was balanced by the decrease of the social 
contributions level. The contribution paid by the employers is 10.75%, with a reduced rate of 
8.5% for those with low income (lower than 352 euros per week) and the contribution supported 
by the employees is 4% of the gross income. Given the very low level of social contributions rate 
in Great Britain, the income from this source represents a small share of the total budgetary 
income.  
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In Malta, the level of social contributions os very low, much under the European Union average. 
The income from this source had a declining evolution during the period 2000-2008, registering 
the  lowest  level  of  all  the  member  states.  The  workers  of  Malta,  the  employers  and  the 
government contribute equally to the social security fund with 10% of the basic salary. 
In Holland, the three important sources in the income formation have equal shares. The social 
security system is composed of the public insurance and the employees’ insurance. The first 
category is financed by all the members of the society, while the second category is supported by 
the employers according to the economic sector in which they work. The employees’ social 
contributions rates are identical to those of the employers. 
Romania is the fourth country in terms of the importance of income from direct taxes to the total 
budgetary  income  after  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Malta.  In  2008,  the  level  of  budgetary  income 
increased with almost 29% in comparison with 2007. This increase of public income came from 
the increase of income from: income tax -23.6%, natural persons’ income tax – 27.8%, VAT – 
30.8%, excizes – 8.7% and social contributions – 24.7% (Mara Eugenia Ramona, Inceu Adrian, 
Cuceu  Ionuţ,  Achim  Monica  Violeta,  2009:  3).  This  confirms  the  importance  of  social 
contributions to the formation of public income. The obligation to pay the rate of social insurance 
belongs to the employer (20.8%) and to the employee (10.5%) in normal working conditions. If 
the employee develops his activity in higher risk conditions, the contribution rate paid by the 
employer increases by 5%; for particular working conditions the total contributions rate is 36.3% 
and for special working conditions, the total contributions rate is 41.3%. 
Examining in general the main sources of budgetary income formation in the European Union in 
2008, we can notice a quite balanced situation, the social contributions having the smallest share 
in the total income (12.6% of GDP), in comparison with the direct taxes (13.5% of GDP) and the 
indirect taxes (31.4% of GDP). 
 
4. Conclusions 
In the current context of the financial crisis it is absolutely necessary to compare the evolution of 
labour fiscality and the effect of the growth of public debts on the tax wedge on labour income. 
In a research conducted by the European Central Bank, it was revealed that in the majority of the 
states which registered an increased of the public debt, the labour taxation increased - Greece, 
Italy and France being relevant examples in this respect. 
Despite the fact that some states have low labour taxes, the labour fiscality remains high in the 
European Union in comparison with other industrialized economies. The increase of the fiscality 
level for the labour income determines the decrease of the employment rate and the raise of the 
unemployment rate. The solution to guarantee a higher employment rate could be the relaxation 
of  the  labour  fiscality.  Some  specialists  consider  that  fiscal  neutrality  in  the  field  of  labour 
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